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have the same effect.8 Under this, the plaintiff argued the negligence of the defendant before marriage gave the plaintiff a cause
of action against him, a "thing in action" and therefore a right
of property and when the defendant married the plaintiff it became her separate property right. The court stated that as used
in the Married Women's Property Act this extended meaning
could not be given. The word "property" in the act must be
read in the light of its general policy so far as any policy at all
can be inferred from it. The defendant did not destroy the plaintiff's property in the ordinary sense but to infringe upon her
right of personal safety and security. Goods would be property
in the true sense.
The English court has undoubtedly given this construction
to a "chose in action" because it was deemed to reach the desirable result in not permitting the wife to sue her husband. If this
were an action against a third party it is clear the marriage would
have no effect and the right could properly be called a property
right within the act. In the West Virginia case of Stevens v.
Friedman?it was held that the marriage of a female plaintiff pending an action brought by her for personal injuries is not cause for
abatement of the action.
The interpretatioi given the meaning of property in the English case indicates a strong tendency to refuse actions in tort by
the wife against the husband. The conclusion reached is satisfactory despite the reasoning employed to support it.
-JEROME KATz.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION AS
GROUND FOR DENYING DECREE oF.-In the recent case of Weeks
v, Pratt et al.,' decided in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, plaintiffs, (the Pratts), sued for
specific performance of an contract into which they had entered
with defendant, who had invented a fuel-saving device for internal
own name against all persons whomsoever, including her husband, the same
civil remedies for the protection and security of her own separate property."
8W. VA. REV. CODE (1931), c. 48, art. 3, § 1. "The separate property,
real and personal, of a married woman, heretofore acquired . .

.

. shall be

and remain her sole and separate property in all-respects as if she were a
single woman." It was held in Clay et ux. v. City of St. Albans, 43 W. Va.
539 (1897) that a married woman may sue alone or she and her husband
together, at law or equity, in any action or suit concerning her separate
property.
'58 NV. Va. 78, 51 S.B. 132 (1905).

'43 F. (2d) 53 (1930).
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combustion engines and a substitute for gasoline to be used therewith. Under the terms of the contract plaintiffs were to pay
$100,000 into the corporation to be formed for which they were
to receive 49 per cent of the common stock and a portion of the
preferred stock. Defendant was to turn over his inventions to the
company, receive reimbursement for his expenses incurred theretofore, 51 per cent of the common stock, and 12,500 of the 25,000
shares of preferred stock. Defendant was.to select a majority of
the board of directors and plaintiffs the rest, but a provision was
inserted whereby a vote of two-thirds of the board was necessary
in order to take any important action. There was evidence that
defendant had been offered up to $1,350,000 by oil companies for
his invention but had refused them, wishing the public. to be
benefited instead of his invention suppressed. There was also
evidence that the inventions were estimated to be worth from
$40,000,000 to $1,000,000,000. These unusual facts constitute the
chief interest of the case.
In its opinion the court makes the statement that "'m such
case the inadequacy of consideration would prevent the specific
enforcement of the contract, regardless of whether actual fraud
be shown."' At first glance this statement appears to be contrary
to the generally accepted view that inadequacy of consideration
alone is not sufficient defense to a suit for specific performance
but that additional factors are essential.'
Before the words under consideration were used the court had
been discussing the fact that, through the provision of the contract
necessitating a two-thirds vote of the board of directors, defendant
was unwittingly deprived of control over his inventions, a result
of the unequal bargaining powers between plaintiffs and defendant, the former clever promoters, and the latter a retired railroad
engineer. The court's statement, beginning with the words "in
such case", clearly shows that the rule (if it be considered such) is
meant to be limited to cases where other factors in addition to
inadequacy of consideration are present.
2 Italics ours.
0Perhaps the best statement of the present rule to be found is in 5 PomEROY,
EQuITY JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed. 1919) 4952, § 2212 (790) :
"The usual statement of the modern rule is that mere inadequacy of
consideration is not such hardship as will prevent specific performance,
unless the inadequacy is so gross as to shock the conscience of the court
and amount to decisive evidence of fraud. *** In a few modern cases
equity has refused relief on the ground of mere gross inadequacy, such
disproportionate advantage to the plaintiff that it 'shocks the conscience
of the court.' But courts generally do not admit this exception, but do

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol37/iss2/13

2

Kwass: Specific Performance, Inadequacy or Consideration as Ground for D
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
The court cites Marks v. Gates' as authority for the statement,
and that case was one in which, along with gross inadequacy of consideration, there was the additional factor of improvidence on the
part of the party defending in specific performance.
Therefore, it seems reasonably clear that the court's words
are in accord with prior adjudications; and, in view of the circumstances of the case,' such weight should be given them.'
-SIDNEY

J. KwAss.

TAXATION-STATE TAX ON GASOLINE CONSUMED IN STATE AS
BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE.-In the case of United States

Airways, Inc., et al. v. Shaw, State Auditor' in which the facts as
agreed, were: The plaintiff operated an interstate and intrastate
air mail and passenger line, using gasoline as motive power for its
give much weight to inadequacy when coupled with other evidence of
hardship as some degree of inequality, improvidence, etc."
Also see WVALSii, TREATISE ON EQUITY (1930), 482 et seq; FRY, SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE (6th ed., NORTHCOTE, 1921), c. 7; POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (2d ed. 1897), 271 et seq; CLARIK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (1919),
171, § 128. For requisites to obtain a decree of specific performance, see 4
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed. 1919) 3330, § 1405.
'154 Fed. 481, 483, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 317, 12 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 120,
(1907), where the court used the following language:
.... in general that mere inadequacy of consideration is not of itself
ground for withholding specific performance unless it is so gross as to
render the contract unconscionable. But where the consideration is so
grossly inadequate as it is in the present case, and the contract is made
without any knowledge at the time of its making on the part of either
of the parties thereto of the nature of the property to be affected thereby, or of its value, no equitable principle is violated if specific performance is denied, and the parties are left to their legal remedies, if any they
have. "I
Also see the notes to the case as reported in L. R. A. and Am. and Eng. Ann.
Cases.
5In addition to the grounds discussed above the court stated that there
was another reason for denying the decree which was that defendant had contracted to serve the company personally, and that it would not enforce only
a part of the contract except where it could be enforced without changing
the contract in any essential particular, and that here the part providing for
defendant's personal services was unenforceable and indivisible from the
rest of the contract.
6 The West Virginia cases, too, seem in accord with the general weight
of authority, though some of them deal with rescission of contracts on grounds
of inadequacy of consideration plus other factors, and others are merely dicta.
See: Hale v. Wilkinson, 21 Gratt. 75 (Va. 1871); Conway v. Sweeney, 24 W.
Va. 643 (1884); Duncan v. Duncan, 104 W. Va. 600, 140 S. E. 689 (1927);
Garten v. Layton, 76 W. Va. 63, 84 S. E. 1058 (1915) (rescission) ; Crotty v.
Effler. 60 W. Va. 258, 266, 54 S. E. 345 (1906); Whittaker v. S. W. Va.
Improvement Co., 34 W. Va. 217, 12 S. E. 507 (1890); Pennybacker v.
Laidley, 33 W. Va. 624, 639, 11 S. E. 39 (1890) (rescission).
143

Fed (2d) 148 (D. C., W. D. Okla. 1930).
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